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Note
Vertical Refusals to Deal Under the Sherman Act:
ProductsLiability and Malley-Duff Divide the
Circuits
INTRODUCTION
A manufacturer and D1,a distributor, enter into a contract
that designates D1 as distributor of the manufacturer's product
within a certain locale. At the behest of D2, a competing distributor, the manufacturer refuses to renew the contract with
D1 when it expires and instead installs D2 as its new distributor. Left without a product line and unable to sue under the
expired distributorship contract, D1 files an antitrust suit

against both the manufacturer and D2,1 alleging that the elimination of D1 from the marketplace constitutes a vertical refusal
to deal that is per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.2 In response, the defendants argue that their conduct
3- D1 sues both the manufacturer and D2 because, under the antitrust
laws, a conspiracy between two or more parties is required for the termination
to be actionable. See, eg., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 104 S. Ct.
1464, 1469 (1984) (noting that independent action is not proscribed by § 1 of the

Sherman Act; a conspiracy between the manufacturer and distributor(s) is required); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705,711 (11th
Cir. 1984) (observing that allocation solely by a franchisor of franchisee territories is not per se illegal because such restraints are imposed unilaterally).
2. Section I of the Sherman Act provides, in relevant part: "Every contract, combination ...
, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States... is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
A vertical refusal to deal is a conspiracy between two or more actors who
stand in a vertical relation to each other in a market structure, such as a manufacturer and a distributor, to eliminate a competing actor, usually another
distributor or a retailer, from the market. See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978). The
term refusal to deal refers to the attempt to terminate the eliminated actor's
source of supply. Vertical refusals to deal are also referred to as vertical
group boycotts. There is no substantive difference between these terms and
they are used interchangeably in this Note.
Vertical refusals to deal between parties at different levels of the market
structure are entirely distinct from horizontal refusals to deal, which are
agreements among competitors to eliminate other competitors or to divide territories and allocate customers. Such horizontal agreements are clear per se
violations of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405
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should not be deemed per se illegal,3 but rather should be
judged by a rule of reason. Before a section 1 violation can be
found under a rule of reason inquiry, D1 must establish that its
termination had a substantial anticompetitive effect in that it
diminished the price and quality choices of the
significantly
4
consumer.
U.S. 596, 608 (1972) ("One of the classic examples of a per se violation of § 1 is
an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structure
to allocate territories in order to minimize competition."); Fashion Originators'
Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465-68 (1941) (holding that an agreement among garment manufacturers to sell only to retailers who follow a policy of not selling garments copied by competing manufacturers is a per se
violation of § 1); Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 44-48 (1904) (holding
that an agreement among an association of manufacturers and dealers of tiles
to exclude a competitor from the trade association and to refrain from doing
business with nonmembers is violative of the Sherman Act). For a discussion
of the anticompetitive effects of horizontal restraints, see L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST §§ 79-82 (1977).
3. A per se violation results when conduct is conclusively presumed to be
pernicious in its effects on competition. Thus, engaging in such conduct is sufficient for the attachment of antitrust liability; anticompetitive impact need
not be shown. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
Examples of per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act include price fixing,
see, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223-24 (1940),
horizontal allocation of customers and territories among competitors, see, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972), and bid rigging in
construction contracts, see, e.g., United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 294
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981); cf. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 n.28 (1977) ("There may be occasional problems
in differentiating vertical restrictions from horizontal restrictions in agreements among the retailers. There is no doubt that restrictions in the latter
category would be illegal per se....

but we do not regard the problems of

proof as sufficiently great to justify a per se rule [for vertical restraints].") (citations omitted).
4. In a rule of reason inquiry, "the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited
as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." Continental T.V., Inc.
v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (footnote omitted); c. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 2, § 66, at 180 ("The classic rule of reason tests an arrangement by
its impact on competition."). For example, in Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp.,
579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978), the Court
noted:
The agreement becomes violative of § 1 of the Sherman Act only if it
is anticompetitive in purpose or effect-in sum, it must be tested by
the rule of reason. Without any consideration of the anticompetitive
purpose or effect, arbitrarily seeking to protect Oreck simply because
Whirlpool refused to renew a contract with Oreck which it had terminated by its own terms, even though this refusal was in whole or in
part, due to persuasion by Sears, disregards the well established rule
that "the antitrust laws

. . .

were enacted for 'the protection of com-

petition, not competitors .... '
Id. at 133-34 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477, 488 (1977) (ellipses in Oreck)) (emphasis in Oreck).
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A court faced with Dl's antitrust claim will discover that
the Supreme Court has found vertical refusals to deal per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act only when the refusals were accompanied by price fixing or horizontal
conspiratorial activity.5 The Court has not squarely addressed
the appropriate standard to be applied when these factors are
absent, leaving lower courts faced with such claims without
clear guidance.6 Two recent court of appeals' decisions considering this issue illustrate the conflict between the circuits that
has arisen due to the lack of direction from the Court. In both
Products Liability Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster
Insurance Cos.7 and Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc v. Crown
Life Insurance Co.,8 an insurance company terminated an
agent's distributorship at the request of a competing agent. In
ProductsLiability, the Seventh Circuit applied the rule of reason to find that the vertical distributor termination did not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 In contrast, the Third
Circuit in Malley-Duff found such conduct to be a per se violation of section 1.10
This Note examines the precedents and policies applicable
to the choice between the per se rule and the rule of reason in
vertical distributor terminations and other vertical refusals to
deal. Part I discusses Supreme Court decisions applying a per
se rule to vertical refusals to deal and. a more recent decision
applying a rule of reason to an analogous vertical territorial restraint. It also reviews the mixed signals that these decisions
have sent to lower courts and the resulting confusion over the
test to be applied to vertical refusals to deal not involving price
fixing or horizontal conspiratorial activity. Part I1 examines
the facts and reasoning in Products Liability and Malley-Duff,
and Part HI analyzes the different approaches adopted by these
cases under applicable precedent and the policies underlying
the antitrust laws. Part HI also discusses the impact that the
per se rule and the rule of reason vil have on economic efficiency. The Note concludes that the per se rule should be re5. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959); inifra

notes 11-21, 38-40, and accompanying text.
6.
7.
8.
9.
59-60.
10.

See
682
734
See

infra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982).
F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984).
ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 663-65; infra text accompanying notes

See Malley-Duff,734 F.2d at 139-44; infra text accompanying notes 72-
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stricted to cases involving price fixing or horizontal
conspiratorial activity and that the rule of reason should govern
other vertical refusals to deal.
I.

ORIGINS OF THE PER SE RULE AND CURRENT
COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION

Per se treatment of vertical refusals to deal can be traced
to Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,"' in which an appliance retailer attempted to prevent a competing retailer from
selling at discount prices by persuading several suppliers to
cease selling to its competitor or to sell only at discriminatorily
high prices.12 The Supreme Court found that a "wide combination" 13 of manufacturers and a retailer that bars a competing
retailer from purchasing goods at the same prices and conditions made available to other retailers in a competitive market
is a group boycott and thus per se unlawful under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 14
The Court faced a similar factual situation in United States
v. General Motors Corp.,15 in which retail automobile dealers
enlisted the aid of their manufacturer to prevent discount retailers from obtaining the product. 16 The Supreme Court reiterated the K/or's per se rule for vertical refusals to deal,
holding that "[e]limination, by joint collaborative action, of discounters from access to the market is a per se violation of the
[Sherman] Act.' 7 Unlike its opinion in K/or's, however, the
Court's opinion placed great emphasis on the conspiracy's potential for fixing the retail prices of automobiles.' 8 According
11.

359 U.S. 207 (1959).

12. See id. at 209, 213.
13. Id. at 213.
14. See id. at 212-13; see also Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the
Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REV. 1165, 116771 (1959) (discussing the attempts by the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court
to formulate a general rule regarding the legality of vertical group boycotts).
15. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
16. In General Motors, an association of retail Chevrolet dealers in the
Los Angeles area complained to General Motors management about the sale of
new Chevrolets by competing, discount dealers. In response, General Motors
personnel obtained promises from all nondiscount dealers to refrain from
dealing with the discounters. The dealers' assocation enforced these agreements and, within one year, retail sales through discount dealers had virtually
ended. See id. at 133-38. The United States brought a civil action to enjoin the
alleged conspiracy between General Motors and the dealers. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. See id. at 129.
17. See id. at 145.
18. The Kor's Court emphasized the "wide combination" of defendants
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to the General Motors Court, the group boycott was instituted
to maintain high retail prices through the elimination of discount sellers,19 a goal that the Court found to be per se unlaw20
ful even though the price fixing was accomplished indirectly.
After Kiors and General Motors, most courts are in basic
agreement that when the purpose and effect of a conspiracy is
to fix prices, the conspiracy is per se illegal under section 1 of
the Sherman Act. 2 ' In Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp.,22

for example, a manufacturer and a distributor conspired to prevent a discounter from obtaining the manufacturer's cabinets.2
Citing Klor's2 4 and General Motors,2s the Third Circuit held
that where "the purpose and effect of the challenged conduct is
to restrain price movement and the free play of market forces,
it is then illegal per se."26 Lower courts are in conflict, however, over whether a per se rule or a rule of reason should govern when the vertical refusal to deal is not accompanied by a
conspiring to drive the plaintiff out of the retail business. See Klor% 359 Us.
at 212-13; suma text accompanying notes 13-14.
19. See General Motors, 384 U.S. at 147 ("We note, moreover, that inherent in the success of the combination in this case was a substantial restraint
upon price competition-a goal unlawful per se when sought to be effected by
combination or conspiracy.") (citations omitted).
20. See id. at 147-48.
21. See Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1234 (7th
Cir. 1982), affd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); Products Liab. Ins.
Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982);
Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595 FMd 164, 168-69 (3d Cir. 1979);
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 130-31 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 325
F.2d 196, 200-04 (9th Cir. 1963).
22. 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979).
23. Id. at 165.
24. See id. at 166 n.8.
25. See id. at 166 n.l.
26. See id. at 169. Although the Cernuto court followed Klors and GeneralMotors on the price-fixing issue, its market-structure analysis is inconsistent with that contained in the Supreme Court cases. The Cernuto court
intimated that a vertical group boycott consisting of a single manufacturer and
a single distributor could be per se illegal, even in the absence of price fixing.
See id. at 168. Such a result does not follow from Kiors or General Motors
because, in those cases, there were multiple conspirators at one level of the
market structure. See infra notes 38-49, 85-91, and accompanying text. The
Cernuto opinion does not clearly reveal which ground, price fixing or market
structure, the court found determinative, see Cernuto, 595 F.2d at 170; Stewart
& Roberts, Viability of the Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rule" Schwinn Down,
How Many to Go? 58 WASI. U.L.Q. 727, 749 (1980), and thus it is uncertain
whether, absent price fixing, the Cernuto court would have imposed per se
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price-fixing motive or effect.2 7
Part of the conflict over the appropriate rule to be applied
in the absence of price fixing results from the amenability of
Klor's and General Motors to different interpretations. Many
antitrust plaintiffs invoke Klor's and General Motors in an attempt to have the per se rule applied against vertical refusals to
deal that do not involve price fixing.2 8 These plaintiffs argue
that the facts of Klor's and General Motors clearly are analogous to those in the challenged refusals to deal because the relationship of the relevant actors in each case was vertical,
involving a conspiracy between manufacturers and a retailer.
They further contend that the conspiracies in Klor's and General Motors restrained the availability of appliances and
automobiles, just as vertical distributor terminations, for example, restrain the availability of the distributed product. Some
courts have accepted this interpretation and have applied a per
se rule regardless of the purpose and effect of the conspiracy. 29
Several courts look beyond these vertical aspects of the
27.

Compare Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos.,

682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying rule of reason) with Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.) (applying per se rule),
cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984). Since Kior's and General Motors, the
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the per se illegality of vertical refusals to deal. Although the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d
1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert granted, 105 S. Ct. 77 (1984), its decision may not
shed much light on the traditional scenario because the case does not involve a
manufacturer's termination of a distributor at the behest of another distributor. Rather, the plaintiff in Pacific Stationery alleges that it was wrongfully
expelled from a nonprofit, industry trade association without sufficient cause
or notice. See 715 F.2d at 1395.
28. See, e.g., Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc. v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 734 F.2d
133, 140-41 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984); M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 979 (1st Cir. 1984); Mendelovitz v. Adolph
Coors Co., 693 F.2d 570, 578 n.14 (5th Cir. 1982); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1236 (7th Cir. 1982), affd, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984); ConTel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 413-14 (6th Cir. 1982); Oreck Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131-33 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
946 (1978).
29. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 14041 (holding that a conspiracy between
a manufacturer and a single dealer is per se illegal because, though actually a
vertical restraint, its desired impact is "horizontal and on the dealer ...
level"); Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404, 410-12 (6th Cir. 1982)
(holding that an initial conspiracy between the manufacturer and a distributor
was transformed into a per se illegal refusal to deal when other dealers responded to the manufacturer's pressure; per se illegality was found because
the desired impact of the restraint was horizontal and on the dealer level);
Cernuto, 595 F.2d at 168 (same as Malley-Dufj); cf. Stewart & Roberts, supra
note 26, at 749 (noting that the compelling nature of Cernuto's "horizontal i-
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conspiracies, however, and read Klor's and General Motors as
primarily price-fixing cases.3 0 This interpretation may rest in
part on General Motors's explicit emphasis of the price-fixing
potential of the group boycott.3 ' Some courts also suggest that

the result in Kior's may have been influenced by the price-fixing effect of that conspiracy. These courts reason that the conspiracy in K/or's essentially eliminated a discount retailer from
the market by preventing it from obtaining appliances or by requiring it to obtain the appliances at discriminatorily high
prices.3 2 If the manufacturers refused to sell the discount retailer any appliances, the price level maintained by other retailers would control. Similarly, if the manufacturers sold the
appliances at discriminatorily high prices, the discount retailer's advantage of low overhead costs would be lost, forcing it
to sell appliances at the same price as other retailers. Price
competition thus would be substantially affected by the conspiracy, and consumers would be deprived of a price choice.
This reading of Kor's and General Motors mandates that
per se liability attach to vertical refusals to deal only when the
refusal is accompanied by price fixing or equivalent anticompetitive acts.33 With Kor's and General Motors so limited, several courts apply the rule of reason to vertical refusals to deal
that do not involve price fixing. In Oreck Corp v. Whirlpool
Corp.,34 for example, Whirlpool terminated Oreck's distributorship at the behest of Sears, a competing distributor, and repact" analysis is unclear because the court relied heavily on the price-fixing
issue).
30. See, eg., M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973,
977-80 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that vertical group boycotts are subject to a rule
of reason analysis); Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins.
Cos., 682 F.2d 660, 664-65 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that the facts of K/ors render
it inapplicable to a vertical group boycott involving a single manufacturer and
a single distributor); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126,131 (2d Cir.)
(en banc) (holding that an alleged agreement between a single manufacturer
and a single dealer is essentially an exclusive distributorship controversy, and
group boycott doctrine is therefore inapplicable), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946
(1978).
31. See GeneralMotors, 384 U.S. at 147-48; supra text accompanying notes
18-20.
32. See, eg., Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos.,
682 F.2d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 1982); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126,
132 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
33. See Products Liab. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Cos., 682
F.2d 660, 663 (7th Cir. 1982); A.H1 Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302,
1305 (9th Cir. 1981); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.)
(en banc), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
34. 579 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
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tained Sears as its exclusive distributor. 35 Relying on Klor's
and General Motors, Oreck alleged that the actions of Whirlpool and Sears constituted a per se illegal vertical group boycott. 36 The Second Circuit rejected Oreck's allegation, in part
because the termination was not motivated by a desire to re37
duce price competition.
An additional factor apparently influencing some courts'
rejection of the per se rule for purely vertical group boycotts is
the horizontal aspect of the conspiracies in Kior's and General
Motors. Numerous appliance manufacturers were involved in
the K/or's refusal to deal, leading the Court to stress that a
"wide combination" of conspirators was involved and not
merely "a single trader refusing to deal with another, [or] a
manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an exclusive distributorship. '38 Similarly, the General Motors conspiracy involved a
"wide combination" including nearly all nondiscount Chevrolet
dealers in the Los Angeles area.39 Thus, both cases revolved
around conspiracies containing horizontal activity among com40
petitors at the same market level.
Since General Motors, the Supreme Court has indicated
that purely vertical arrangements may be subject to a less stringent standard than are horizontal agreements. In Continental
T V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,41 the Court held that vertical
territorial resale restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on a
35. 579 F.2d at 128.
36. See id.at 131.
37. See id at 130 ("[lIt is undisputed that, at all times relevant, Sears was
selling its 'Kenmore' vacuum cleaners at prices below those charged by Oreck
for comparable 'Whirlpool' models.... [There is no evidence] that Whirlpool
was attempting to maintain high resale prices for its products by conspiring
with its distributors or that its actions toward Oreck were an effort to chastise
a dealer for refusing to cooperate in a scheme to fix or maintain prices.") (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); see also A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach.
Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (9th Cir. 1981) (observing that "in most circumstances dealer terminations or substitutions do not adversely affect competition in the [relevant product] market") (citations omitted).
38. See Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212-13 (footnote omitted). Admiral, Emerson,
General Electric, Olympic, Philco, Rheem, RCA, Tappan, Whirlpool, and
Zenith were named as defendants in Klors. See id at 209 n.1.
39. See General Motors, 384 U.S. at 129 (noting that the defendants included three associations of retail Chevrolet dealers in the Los Angeles area
and that "[a]ll of the Chevrolet dealers in the area belong[ed] to one or more
of the ... associations").

40. Thus, the Oreck court distinguished Klor's and General Motors as involving horizontal restraints, in contrast to the vertical restraint created by
the Sears/Whirlpool agreement. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 131.
41. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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wholesaler are to be judged by the rule of reason.42 The Court
based this conclusion on the premise that competition between
differing brands of the same product, or interbrand competition, is more deserving of the protection of the antitrust laws
than is competition between sellers of the same brand, or intrabrand competition. 43 The Court recognized that vertical distribution restrictions, while reducing intrabrand competition,
may foster interbrand competition by allowing the manufacturer to achieve more control and greater efficiencies in the distribution of its products.4 4 The Court therefore concluded that
42. See id.at 57-59. The Court in GTE Sylvania overruled its earlier decision in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which
held that vertical restrictions on the resale of products sold by a manufacturer
to a distributor are per se illegal, see Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 378-8L In addition,
the Court had held that when Schwinn sold goods on consignment to its distributors and retained title, dominion, and risk, vertical distribution restraints
should be judged by a rule of reason standard. See id. at 380-8L This distinction was criticized as lacking a logical basis, see e.g., Pollock, The Schwinn Per
Se Rule-- The Case for Reconsideration,44 ANTrrUST LJ.557, 562-63 (1975),
and was abandoned in GTE Sylvania.
43. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57. The protection of interbrand
competition is the primary concern of antitrust law. Id. at 52 n.19; see also
Copy-Data Sys., Inc. v. Toshiba Am., Inc., 663 F.2d 405, 411 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that "restrictions imposed by this dual distributor on its competitor-customers have sufficient potential for enhancing interbrand competition that
they should be judged by the rule of reason notwithstanding the adverse impact that they may have on intrabrand competition"); Worthen Bank & Trust
Co. v. National BankAmericard Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 127-30 (8th Cir. 1973) (holding that BankAmericard bylaw prohibiting member banks from joining Master
Charge system not per se illegal because it may have promoted interbrand
competition between the two national credit card systems; absent the bylaw,
the systems would eventually merge and competition would be substantially
lessened), cert denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); U.S. DEPVT OF JUSTICE, VERTICAL

REsTRAuNS GUIDELINES § 2.1, at 4 (1985) (observing that the appropriate focus
of antitrust laws is interbrand competition because restraints on interbrand
competition have a negative impact on economic welfare, whereas vertical restraints affecting only intrabrand competition generally represent little anticompetitive threat) [hereinafter cited as DOJ GUIDELINES], reprinted in
[Jan.-June] ANTrTRUsT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Spec. Supp. Jan.
24, 1985).
44. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-56. The Court noted that "[s]ervice
and repair are vital for many products, such as automobiles and major household appliances. The availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitiveness of his product." See id at 55.
Commentators have argued persuasively that vertical restrictions such as
those at issue in GTE Sylvania promote interbrand competition because they
allow manufacturers to achieve maximum efficiency in the distribution of
their products and to ensure that, where necessary, presale, point-of-sale, and
postsale services are provided. See, eg., Butler & Baysinger, Vertical Restraints of Trade as ContractualIntegration: A Synthesis of Relational Contracting Theory, Transaction-Cost Economics, and Organization Theory, 32
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territorial resale restrictions affecting intrabrand competition
had not been shown to be so pernicious in their anticompetitive
45
effects as to require per se treatment.
By interpreting Klor's and General Motors as involving
horizontal activity, courts can rely on GTE Sylvania's reasoning
to conclude that purely vertical refusals to deal should, like the
analogous vertical territorial restrictions, usually be judged by a
rule of reason.46 Even using this interpretation, however,
courts face the difficult question of whether the facts before
them warrant application of the per se rule despite the presumption for the rule of reason. The GTE Sylvania Court did
not establish a blanket rule of reason for all vertical restrictions, but instead stated that its holding does "not foreclose the
possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions
EMORY L.J. 1009, 1057-64 (1983); Strasser, Vertical TerritorialRestraints After Sylvania: A Policy Analysis and Proposed New Rule, 1977 DUKE L.J. 775,
794-830.

45. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59. For further discussions of the
policy arguments supporting the application of the rule of reason to vertical

restraints, see, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 283-85 (1975); Preston, Restrictive
DistributionArrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards,
30 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 506 (1965).
46. Although vertical territorial restraints are distinct from vertical refusals to deal, the Supreme Court's move to a rule of reason treatment of vertical
distribution restraints may portend a similar shift on vertical refusals to deal.
See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 22-26 (1981) (suggesting that all
purely vertical distribution restraints should be legal per se); Stewart & Roberts, supra note 26, at 745-49 (discussing the impact of GTE Sylvania on boycotts and concerted refusals to deal).
The shift to a rule of reason is already apparent in the opinions of some
lower courts. For example, in A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star. Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302
(9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment against a distributor that challenged the manufacturer's decision to terminate it in favor of
another distributor. The court explained:
It is well established that exclusive distribution arrangements, while
restraints in one sense, nevertheless serve to promote interbrand
competition.... Manufacturers therefore may grant exclusive dealerships, and even cut off an existing dealer in order to do so ....
provided there is no overriding purpose to eliminate competition in
the relevant market ....
Competition is promoted when manufacturers are given wide latitude in establishing their method of distribution and in choosing particular distributors.... Judicial deference to
the manufacturer's business judgment is grounded on the assumption
that the manufacturer's interest in minimum distribution costs will
benefit the consumer ....
A contrary rule would foster rigidity in
distribution arrangements, a result antithetical to a market dependent
on vigorous competition.
Id. at 1306 (citing GTE Sylvania) (other citations omitted).
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might justify per se prohibition."47 The Court qualified this
statement by declaring that "departure from the rule-of-reason
standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than . . . upon formalistic line drawing." 48 The vagueness of this standard leaves trial courts with virtually no framework within which to weigh the anticompetitive effects against
the procompetitive benefits of a challenged vertical restraint
49
when deciding which rule should govern.
II.

PRODUCTS OF CONFUSION: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AND MlALEY-DUFF

ProductsLiability InsuranceAgency, Inc, v. Crum & Forster Insurance Cos.50 and Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc. v.
Crown Life Insurance Co.5 1 highlight the conflict surrounding
the appropriate rule to be applied to vertical refusals to deal
presenting neither price-fixing motives or effects nor any horizontal activity. Although both cases presented almost identical
factual patterns, the Seventh Circuit in Products Liability applied the rule of reason,5 2 whereas the Third Circuit in MalleyDuff applied a per se rule.s3
In Products Liability, the plaintiff had sold Crum & Forster's line of products liability insurance, obtaining the insurance through Paris, O'Day & Reed, Inc., a Crum & Forster
agent.4 After a falling out with Paris, plaintiff requested that
Crum & Forster appoint it as an agent authorized to sell the insurance.,ss Crum & Forster refused, whereupon plaintiff initiated an antitrust action against both Crum & Forster and Paris,
alleging that plaintiff's exclusion from the products liability insurance business was the result of a collective refusal to deal
47. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58.
48. See id. at 58-59.
49. See Handler, Antitrust-1978,78 COLUML I. REv. 1363, 1370 n.43 (1978)

(discussing the varying responses of the lower courts to GTE Sylvania); qf
Strasser, supra note 44, at 784 ("The [GTE Sylvania] Court recognized that
cases of this sort require a determination of how much intrabrand competition
must be sacrificed in order to gain an imprecise measure of interbrand competition but gave no guidance or methodology for the application of this weighing
process.") (footnote omitted).

50. 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982).
51. 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 105 S. Ct. 564 (1984).
52.
53.

See Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 663.
See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-42.

54. ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 661.
55.

Id. at 661-62.
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that was per se unlawful under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 50
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, reasoning that the plaintiff had not established the
7
existence of a conspiracy between Crum & Forster and Paris.5

On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the
district court that plaintiff was unable to prove that its exclusion was "anything more than a unilateral act of Crum & Forster"5 8 and also holding that vertical refusals to deal are per se
illegal only when used to fix prices. 59 Other vertical refusals to
deal, stated the court, are governed by the rule of reason, which
requires the offended party to demonstrate the anticompetitive
effect of the refusal. 60 The court concluded that plaintiff had
presented no evidence in support of its claim that its elimination from the insurance market had detrimentally affected the
consumers' price and quality choices for insurance6 ' and, therefore, plaintiff had failed to establish an antitrust injury. 62 The
court rejected plaintiff's attempt to rely on Kior's, distinguishing the decision as a "horizontal combination" 63 involving a
"wide combination" of conspirators,6 as opposed to plaintiff's
"private squabble [that] does not threaten consumers' welfare
'65
even remotely.
In Malley-Duff, the plaintiff was an insurance agent in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Crown Life Insurance Company. 3 Plaintiff's agency with Crown Life was terminated
56.
57.

See i&L at 661.
See id. at 662.

58. See id. at 663.
59. See id.
60. See id.; supra note 4 and accompanying text.
61. See ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 664.
62. See id. at 663-65.
63. See id at 665.
64. Id.
65. Id. On the same day that Products Liability was decided, another
three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit stated that "[a] per se unlawful
[group] boycott has two essential elements: (1) at least some of the boycotters
are competitors of each other and the target and (2) the boycott is designed to
protect the boycotters from competition with the target." See Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1236 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted),
affd, 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984). This rule is somewhat more restrictive than Products Liability's holding that vertical refusals to deal are to be judged by the
rule of reason, but the Seventh Circuit, in a more recent case, indicated in
dicta that ProductsLiability is the law of the circuit. See Marrese v. American
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1983), affd on
other grounds, 726 F.2d 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds,
105 S.Ct. 1327 (1985).
66. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 137. Plaintiff was one of two Crown Life
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when Clarke Lloyd, a Crown Life vice president, created a
holding company to act as Crown Life's new general agent in
western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois.6 Following the termination, plaintiff sued Crown Life, Lloyd, and the holding
company, alleging a per se illegal group boycott." Plaintiff did
not allege that the termination was motivated by a desire to fix
prices or that it had such an effect.6 9 The trial court, relying on
Products Liability, granted a directed verdict for the defendants on the antitrust claim,70 stating that "no antitrust offense
could be established without proof that the alleged anticompeti71
tive conduct adversely affected consumers."
The Third Circuit reversed the antitrust judgment, holding
that a per se illegal refusal to deal exists when the termination
is not unilateral but results from distributors working in concert with a supplier to exclude a competing distributor from the
market. 72 The court expressly rejected Products Liability's
holding that vertical refusals to deal are per se illegal only
when employed to fix prices.7 3 The court stated that a vertical
general agents in the Pittsburgh area and had represented Crown Life continuously for 23 years until its termination. Between 1967 and 1977, plaintiff had
produced over $58 million in business for Crown Life. Id.
67. See id. at 137-39. To accomplish the termination, an unrealistic production quota was imposed on plaintiff, and Crown Life terminated plaintiff
when it was unable to meet the quota. Id. at 138-39. Because Crown Life complied with the 30-day notice of termination clause, see id,at 137, 139, plaintiff's
termination did not violate the agency agreement.
68. See id. at 136. Plaintiff also alleged that defendants were liable under
Pennsylvania law for conspiring to tortiously interfere with Malley-Duff's contract and for tortiously interfering with the contract. Id.The jury returned a
$900,000 verdict on the conspiracy claim, id. at 139, but the Third Circuit reversed the jury verdict because of inconsistent answers to interrogatories, see
id. at 144-47.
69. Plaintiff relied entirely on a group boycott theory. Id. at 140.
70. Id. The trial court determined that the defendants had not committed
an antitrust violation under either a per se or a rule of reason theory. Id. The
trial court relied on Products Liability, 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982), in making
its finding that no per se violation had occurred. See Malley.Duff, 734 F.2d at
140.
71. See Malley-Duff,734 F.2d at 140 (citation omitted).
72. See id. at 141-42. Implicit in the court's finding of per se illegality is a
determination that defendants Agency Holding, Lloyd, and Kerry Craig, a former Crown Life employee who left Crown Life to work for Lloyd at Agency
Holding, were competitors conspiring among themselves and with Crown Life
to exclude plaintiff. See id. at 141; supra note 1. This, however, was not so.
Lloyd and Craig were principals of Agency Holding, not insurance agents competing with plaintiff. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 137-39. Thus, Agency Holding was the only agent conspiring with Crown Life to cause plaintiffs
termination.
73. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-41. The court's rejection of Products
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refusal to deal can assume horizontal aspects, and thus become
per se illegal, if one of the conspirators and the terminated
party are at the same level of the market structure. 7 4 Therefore, according to the Third Circuit, if a distributor is involved
in a conspiracy to eliminate another distributor, the refusal to
deal is judged as horizontal activity even when the conspiracy is
a purely vertical one between a single manufacturer and a lone
distributor. The court consequently found that the refusal to
deal in Malley-Duff was per se illegal even though exerted vertically by an insurer and another agent because its desired impact, the elimination of an agent, was on the horizontal, or
dealer, level.75

III. THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE PER SE RULE AND
THE RULE OF REASON: PRECEDENTS, POLICIES,
AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
The conflict between the Seventh Circuit in Products Liability and the Third Circuit in Malley-Duff has arisen in part
from their different interpretations of the precedents applicable to vertical refusals to deal. Although both circuits cited essentially the same cases in support of their results, each
attached radically different meanings to those cases.76 Only the
Seventh Circuit in Products Liability evaluated its choice between the rule of reason and the per se rule in light of the purposes of the antitrust laws 77 and the impact of each rule on the
underlying policy of promoting economic efficiency.78 Only by
examining these concerns in light of relevant precedent can a
rational choice be made between the applicability of the per se
rule or the rule of reason to vertical refusals to deal.
Liability followed shortly after its observation that Products Liability is a factually similar case. See id. at 140.
74. See id. at 140-41. In reaching this conclusion, the court revived the
faulty market-structure analysis of Cernuto, Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp., 595
F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1979). See supra note 26. For a discussion of the flaws in
the Cernuto analysis, see infra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
75. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 143-44. A peripheral issue in Malley-Duff
was whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982), exempts insurers from antitrust liability. The court concluded that it does not.
See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 144. The Seventh Circuit did not confront this
issue in Products Liability.
76. See infra notes 79-99 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 100-10 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
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A. APPLiCABLE PRECEDENT
As previously noted, 7 9 the Supreme Court decisions
squarely confronting vertical refusals to deal, Mior's and General Motors, indicate that price-fixing considerations were paramount in finding the refusals to be per se illegal. Although
Kior's focused more on plaintiffs forced exclusion from the
market than on the price-fixing issue, 0 the General Motors
Court stated that the attempt to eliminate discounters was a
major, if not decisive, factor in its finding of per se illegality. 8 '
In contrast, price competition was not an issue in Products
Liability and Malley-Duff because neither plaintiff alleged or
attempted to prove that its elimination would affect retail insurance prices.8 2 Absent any allegations of price fixing, the
presumption is that the new agents would charge the same
prices as the terminated agents8s and that price competition
consequently would not suffer. The Third Circuit's unqualified
reliance on Kor's and General Motors84 therefore appears unjustified because both cases involved price fixing.
The refusals to deal in Klor's and General Motors also contained elements of horizontal conspiratorial activity: both cases
involved multiple competitors at the same level of the market
structure acting in concert.as Where horizontal activity at one
level of a vertical group boycott is absent, Klor's and General
Motors are far less compelling as precedent. Because such joint
action is the justification for the per se illegality of horizontal
refusals to deal,8 6 vertical group boycotts that involve such joint
79.

See supra Part I.

80. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13
(1959); supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
81. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 147 (1966);
supra text accompanying notes 18-20.
82.

See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140 (reversing a directed verdict that was

based on the absence of price-fixing allegations or other anticompetitive conduct); ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 663 (noting that there was no evidence of an
intent to raise prices).
83. See Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 664. The Seventh Circuit noted that if
Crum & Forster was in a competitive market, the plaintiff's customers would
not be hurt by plaintiff's exclusion from the insurance-underwriting business
because competition would force Crum & Forster to offer terms competitive
with other insurers. No evidence was presented concerning the structure or
competitiveness of the insurance-underwriting market. See id.
84. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 141-42. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit
distinguished Kior's as inapplicable to the facts presented in Products Liability. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40; supra note 2; infra note 94.
86. Horizontal activity among competitors has been termed a "naked (re-
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action also should be illegal per se.87 Conversely, in the absence of joint action at one level of the market structure, per se
illegality should not attach to a refusal to deal.88 Instead, the
rule of reason should control unless the "demonstrable economic effect"8 9 of the refusal to deal indicates otherwise.
Because the collaborations in Products Liability and
Malley-Duff involved only one actor at each level of the market
structure, the Kor's and General Motors per se rule should be
inapplicable. The Seventh Circuit expressly recognized this
factual distinction in Products Liability when it rejected the
plaintiff's invocation of Klor's: "But the Court in Klor's distinguished the case of 'a manufacturer and a dealer agreeing to an
straint] of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition." See White

Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); see also United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (noting that horizontal territorial

restraints are per se illegal); Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to
Deak A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 CoLUM. L. REv. 685, 697 n.62 (1979)

(suggesting that advance agreement among competitors not to do business
with a company is the evil justifying per se treatment).
87. For example, in Corn-Tel, Inc. v. DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir.
1982), plaintiff bid on a subcontract to install a DuKane-manufactured sound
system in a school. Defendant Central Sound, a DuKane-franchised distributor, also bid on the contract. When plaintiff was awarded the contract, Central
Sound refused to supply plaintiff with DuKane equipment, and plaintiff then
obtained commitments from two nearby DuKane distributors. Central Sound
then persuaded DuKane to try to prevent plaintiff from obtaining DuKane
equipment. The conspiracy was successful and plaintiff, unable to obtain the
required equipment either from Central Sound or from its other two putative
suppliers, resigned from the project. See id. at 406-08.
Despite the absence of price fixing and the vertical nature of the refusal
to deal, the Sixth Circuit found the defendant's conduct to be per se illegal because the desired impact of the boycott was on the distributor level. See id. at
409-14. The Corn-Tel court's market-structure analysis is more consistent with
Klor's than is the Cernuto court's analysis. See supra note 26. In Corn-Tel, the
conspiracy was not, as in Cernuto and Oreck, an agreement between a single
manufacturer and a single distributor. Joint activity among competitors was
established when competing distributors succumbed to DuKane's demand that
they not sell to plaintiff. At that point, the conspiracy was no longer a purely
vertical refusal to deal between DuKane and Central Sound. Cf.Case Comment, Vertical Agreements to Terminate Competing Distributors: Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1160, 1163 (1979) ("A vertical element is usually present in boycott cases ....
since the success of a boycott
often depends on the cooperation of suppliers or customers in refusing to deal
with the boycott victim. But it is the horizontal element that justified applying a rule of per se illegality.") (footnote omitted).
88. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59
(1977); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir.) (en banc),
cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978); see also Handler, Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines: An UnprecedentedSupreme Court Term--1977, 77 COLUM. L.
REV.979, 985-87 (1977) (discussing the opinions in GTE Sylvania).
89. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59; see supra text accompanying note 48.
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exclusive distributorship[,]'... which is one way of describing
an agreement ... between Paris and Crum & Forster that

[plaintiff] would not be allowed to compete with Paris as a
Crum & Forster agent."' 90 The court thus found that any agreement between the Products Liability defendants would not be
a "wide combination" employed to eliminate plaintiff from the
insurance business, unlike the attempt of the multiple appliance manufacturers and the retailer to drive a discount retailer
out of business in Klor's.9 1 The Seventh Circuit therefore properly restricted Kior's to vertical group boycotts containing horizontal elements.
In contrast, the Malley-Duff court found that the per se
rule of Kior's and General Motors was applicable to a vertical
group boycott involving a single insurer and a single agent. The
Third Circuit reasoned that the vertical refusal to deal had horizontal elements because the terminated party was a competitor
of one of the conspirators.9 2 The court concluded that the vertical refusal to deal had its desired impact on the horizontal level
and was therefore per se illegal.93 This transformation of a vertical refusal to deal into a horizontal group boycott masks a fatal flaw in the court's .analysis. A per se illegal horizontal
group boycott consists of conspiratorial activity among competitors, not a horizontal relationship between a conspirator and
the terminated party.9 4 Unless the plaintiff conspired with its
90. Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 665 (quoting K/or% 359 U.S. at 212).
91. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
92. The court attempted to convert the facts of Malley-Duff into a Kior's
situation by creating the appearance of concerted action among competitors at
one level of the boycott. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 141. This is an inaccurate interpretation of the facts. See supra note 72.
93. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-41; supra note 74 and accompanying
text.
In contrast, although the Seventh Circuit indicated it would follow
Cernuto, see Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 663, the context in which the court
cited Ce -nuto demonstrates that this approval applied only to the Cernuto decision's price-fixing aspect. See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
94. See A.H. Cox & Co. v. Star Mach. Co., 653 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th Cir.
1981) (holding that a purely vertical refusal to deal between a distributor and a
manufacturer is not transformed into a per se illegal horizontal group boycott
by the distributor's "anticompetitive animus" toward its terminated competitor); supra note 2. The most cogent explanation was offered by the Second
Circuit in Oreck:
The present case, involving as it does an alleged agreement between a
single manufacturer and a single dealer, is, in essence, an exclusive
distributorship controversy and the "group boycott" doctrine, is,
therefore, not applicable. Because Sears is a large company presumably selling a large number of vacuum cleaners does not, ipso facto,
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competitor, there is no horizontal conspiracy in a case involving
an agreement between two parties on different levels of the
market structure. Absent collaboration among competitors at
one level of a vertical refusal to deal, the per se rule of Klor's
and General Motors should not control.
Finally, the Third Circuit's rationale in Malley-Duff is inconsistent with GTE Sylvania,95 in which the court stated that
departure from the rule of reason standard in vertical restraint
cases is justified only upon a showing of "demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing."""
Malley-Duff's reasoning encompasses more of the latter than
of the former. After characterizing the refusal to deal as horizontal, the court held it to be per se illegal without even a cursory examination of the economic effects of the defendants'
conduct. 97 Because neither price nor consumer choice was affected, 98 the termination of the Malley-Duff plaintiff had little,
if any, economic effect on consumers. Under the rationale of
GTE Sylvania, therefore, application of a per se rule was unwarranted; the Products Liability court reached that very conclusion after an analysis of the group boycott's effect on
competition. 99

B.

THE PURPOSES OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS

The essential purpose of the antitrust laws is, in the
Supreme Court's view, to ensure that retail purchasers of goods
and services will find fair price competition in an open market.10 0 Because injuries to competition adversely affect general
consumer welfare,1 01 the Court has instructed that the antitrust
laws exist for "the protection of competition, not competiconvert this case into a horizontal conspiracy warranting per se
treatment.
Oreck, 579 F.2d at 131 (footnote omitted).
95. 433 U.S. 36 (1977); see supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
96. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 58-59; supra text accompanying note 48.
97. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140 (finding that the district court erred
in holding that no antitrust offense could be established without proof that the
challenged conduct adversely affected consumers; in a per se case, the court
need not determine whether public injury occurred).
98. See infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
99. See ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 663-64; supra text accompanying notes
61-65.
100. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1979).
101. See Klingsberg, Bull's Eyes and Carom Shots: Complications and Conflicts on Standing to Sue and Causation Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 16
ANTITRUST BULL. 361, 364 (1971).
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tors."' 0 2 Antitrust injuries therefore "should reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the violation."'10 3 In the absence of
injury to competition, antitrust laws should not provide a
remedy.
Ensuring protection of the consumer through competition
requires the preservation of interbrand competition ° 4 because
such competition guarantees the existence of numerous brands
and thus provides the consumer with a wide choice of product
price, style, and quality. Moreover, the presence of strong
interbrand competition renders it difficult, if not impossible, for
a manufacturer to wield sufficient market power to control
price by restricting intrabrand competition. 105 When neither
interbrand competition nor price is affected, consumer choice is
unhindered and any injury incurred should not be redressed by
the antitrust laws.
In Products Liability and Malley-Duff, only intrabrand
competition was involved. In both cases, insurance remained
available to the terminated agents' former customers, albeit
through new agents. Furthermore, no effect on the price of insurance was alleged to have occurred or likely to occur from
the terminations. Although the plaintiffs' business interests
102. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488
(1977) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)) (em-

phasis omitted).
103. See id at 489.
104. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Professor Wesley J.
Liebeler argues that restraints on interbrand competition should be equated
with horizontal restraints and deemed per se illegal, while limitations on

intrabrand competition are, in terms of their effect on competition, on a par
with vertical restraints and thus governed by the rule of reason. See Liebeler,
Intrabrand"Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania 30 UCLA L REV. 1, 29-30 (1982).
This approach, Professor Liebeler argues, is consistent with GTE Sylvania.
See id.
Professor Richard A. Posner has taken an even stronger position, advocating a rule of per se legality for all purely vertical restraints not affecting price
competition because of "the absence of either theoretical or empirical grounds
for condemning purely vertical restrictions as anticompetitive." See Posner,
supra note 46, at 23.
105. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 n.19 ("[W]hen interbrand competition exists... it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand
market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product."); Oreck, 579 F.2d at 130 n.5; supra note 44 and accompanying text. For example, in Oreck, the plaintiff could show no anticompetitive effects from its elimination. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 130. Thus, even

though Sears and Whirlpool were able to eliminate Oreck, resulting in a restriction of intrabrand competition, they did not have sufficient market power
to control prices.
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were harmed, competition was unimpaired. A per se approach
to these vertical refusals to deal therefore is unjustified because
per se liability would not advance the consumers' interest in
competition. Moreover, any antitrust recovery would be inappropriate because an injury to competition is a prerequisite to a
06
successful antitrust suit.
The Seventh Circuit in Products Liability recognized these
limited purposes of the antitrust laws. In dismissing plaintiff's
case as a "private squabble [that] does not threaten consumers'
welfare even remotely,"' 0 7 the court correctly concluded that
trebled antitrust recoveries are appropriate only when competition is impaired. 0 8 In contrast, the Third Circuit in MalleyDuff failed to consider that the plaintiff's termination did not
harm consumer welfare.' 0 9 The proper course would have been
to restrict the plaintiff to its contract and tort remedies" and
not to allow it the windfall of treble damages. No other approach is consistent with the purposes of the antitrust laws.
C.

THE IMPACT ON ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Commentators recently have argued that application of per
se rules to vertical restraints may cause economic inefficiencies
by reducing business flexibility."' These commentators con106. See supra text accompanying note 103; cf.Klingsberg, supra note 101,
at 364 (suggesting that, in merger cases, a "terminated distributor who claims
injury [that is] not ... a consequence of a lessening of competition ... would
probably be unable to recover") (footnote omitted).
107. See ProductsLiab., 682 F.2d at 665; supra text accompanying note 65.
108. See Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 663-64; supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
109. By confining its analysis to the market-structure aspects of Kior's, the
Malley-Duff court was able to avoid this issue. The court examined the vertical relationship of the defendants and their attempt to exclude plaintiff from
the market and, without a discussion of the price-fixing aspects of Kor's, Imposed per se liability. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-41; supra text accompanying notes 72-75. Once per se liability was imposed, the court did not need to
consider the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff or the lack of anticompetitive effect. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-42.
110. Where a concerted refusal to deal is employed to ensure the conspirators a monopoly in their line of business, the refusal to deal has often been
enjoined as illegal under the common law. See P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 130, at 1023-26 (5th ed. 1984). Moreover, if a distributor is terminated in contravention of the distributorship agreement, it will be able to
sue under the contract. This option, however, was unavailable to the plaintiff
in Malley-Duff. See supra note 67.
111. See, e.g., Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966); Bork, Vertical
Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REv. 171, 180-82 [hereinafter
cited as Bork, Vertical Restraints];Posner, supra note 45, at 283-85; Comment,
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tend that commercial entities employ vertical restraints only to
achieve more efficient operations." For example, a manufacturer will restrict distributors to certain territories only if consumers are more attracted by the possible benefits of the
restraint, such as the distributors' ability to provide increased
services and product information, than they would be by the
3
lower prices possible if such benefits were not available."
Thus, the commentators assert, such restraints should not be
deemed to violate antitrust laws because they will be adopted
only when they are economically efficient." 4
This analysis is pertinent to vertical refusals to deal." 5
Just as judicial limitations on vertical distribution restraints reduce economic efficiency by preventing manufacturers from
providing increased services or information, attaching per se liability to vertical refusals to deal makes manufacturers reluctant to terminate inefficient distributors." 6 In Orec Corp. v.
Whirlpool Corp.," 7 the Second Circuit endorsed this justification for permitting vertical terminations, reasoning that under
freedom of contract principles the manufacturer has the prerogative to decide with whom it will deal." 8 Therefore, a manufacturer should not be liable under the antitrust laws when it
elects not to renew a distributor's contract, even if its decision
is at-the behest of a competing distributor, unless the terminaAntitrust Laws-Sherman Act-Vertical Restraints: Enforcement of Resale
Location Restrictions Is a Per Se Violation of Section One of the Sherman
Act-GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc=, 88 HARV. L REV. 636, 641
(1975) (noting that manufacturers prefer to set the lowest possible retail price
in order to increase sales and maximize revenue).
112. See, eg., Bork, Vertical Restraints,supra note Mii, at 180.
113. Id. at 181.
114:. See id. at 180-81; Posner, supra note 46, at 23; Posner, supra note 45, at
293-94.
115. See Posner, supra note 46, at 23.
116. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57; Orec, 579 F.2d at 133-34; Bauer,
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deaf: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 685, 699 (1979) (noting that the justifications for refusals to deal include the need to eliminate some competition-presumably
intrabrand-for efficient operation, societal benefits accompanied by only minimal competitive injuries, and the fact that refusals to deal are neutral in their
effects on competition).
117. 579 Fl2d 126 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1978).
118. See 579 F.2d at 133; see also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp.,
104 S. Ct. 1464, 1469 (1984) (manufacturer has right to decide with whom it
will deal, as long as it does so independently); DOJ GUIDEUNES, supra note 43,
§ 2.5, at 5 (manufacturer selection of limited number of outlets and refusal to
sell through other outlets is clearly proper), reprinted in [Jan.-June] Airm.
TRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1199 (Spec. Supp. Jan. 24, 1985).
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tion causes some anticompetitive effect in the relevant product
market. 119
The Malley-Duff court, however, did not address the possibility that the defendants' actions were justified by valid business reasons. Lloyd's attempt to centralize all Crown Life
general agencies in the Pittsburgh-Cleveland-Chicago area into
one holding company could have been motivated by a desire to
increase efficiency and sales of Crown Life insurance. 2 0 The
Malley-Duff court focused only on the circumstances of the
plaintiff's termination without searching for anticompetitive effects. 121 In contrast, the Products Liability court recognized
the manufacturer's right to select its distributors and the necessity that a plaintiff prove anticompetitive effects in order to
22
prevail.
CONCLUSION
Purely vertical refusals to deal that are not employed to fix
prices and that do not contain elements of horizontal conspiratorial activity should not be deemed to be per se violations of
section 1 of the Sherman Act but rather should be judged by a
rule of reason standard. This result is consistent with Supreme
Court precedent and conforms with the consumer protection
policy underlying the antitrust laws. Moreover, analyzing vertical refusals to deal under the rule of reason maximizes economic efficiency and business flexibility.
ChristopherD. Mitchell

119. See Oreck, 579 F.2d at 133. The court reasoned that if Sears could do a
better job distributing and marketing Whirlpool vacuum cleaners than plaintiff could, Whirlpool's decision to replace plaintiff with Sears should not have
antitrust consequences. See id. at 132 n.7 (Whirlpool's decision to terminate
plaintiff motivated by legitimate business concerns; plaintiff apparently had
disregarded terms of its contract and refused to follow Whirlpool's marketing
strategy).
120. See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53
(5th Cir. 1977) (registration rules intended to improve the quarter horse
breed); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416
F.2d 71, 76-78 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) (horizontal refusals by manufacturers to renew exclusive sales rights motivated by their dissatisfaction with plaintiff's performance as a distributor).
121. See Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140-42.
122. See Products Liab., 682 F.2d at 663-65.

